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ith house prices often below the face value 
of mortgages these days, the expected return 
on many mortgages has tumbled, since one 
of the major forces supporting mortgages, the 
collateral, has weakened. One source of these mortgage 
problems has been the validity of the home appraisal, 
which is supposed to be an objective and expert dollar 
valuation of the house that should help make a mortgage 
less risky. Unfortunately, the appraisal process can go 
awry and often has. As Leonard Nakamura shows in 
this article, appraisals have been biased upward, making 
mortgages riskier. Now a reverse risk is at work: The bias 
is going the other way, causing home valuations to be 
underestimated, possibly making new mortgages harder 
to obtain. In addition to problems of bias, Nakamura 
discusses the appraisal process, how it’s supposed to work, 
and how it can go awry. 
When housing prices fall and 
mortgage borrowers lose their jobs and 
fall behind on mortgage payments, an 
important question arises: How much 
is any given house worth if it were to 
be sold?  In the not-too-distant past, 
say, 2005, when house prices were 
still spiraling upward, the answer was 
almost always “more than the amount 
borrowed.”  However, more recently, 
a typical answer has been, “not so 
much.”  With many house prices 
below the face value of mortgages, 
the expected return on many of these 
mortgages has tumbled since one of 
the major forces supporting mortgages, 
the collateral, has weakened.
As we now know, that situation 
fed the creation of a major world 
financial crisis. As we pick ourselves 
up from the crisis, we see that one 
source of these mortgage problems 
has been the validity of the home 
appraisal, which is supposed to be an 
objective and expert dollar valuation 
of the house that should help make a 
mortgage safer and more marketable. 
Unfortunately, the appraisal process 
can go awry and often has.  As we 
shall see, appraisals have been biased 
upward. This made mortgages riskier, 
since too much was lent out on homes. 
One of the safeguards, the appraisal, 
failed to perform its role of limiting 
mortgages to the underlying value of 
the houses.
Now a reverse risk is at work: The 
bias is going the other way, causing 
home valuations to be underestimated, 
and this may make new mortgages 
harder to obtain. If so, this could delay 
improvement in housing markets, 
which, in turn, could cause house 
prices to fall more than they otherwise 
would, possibly causing additional 
losses to mortgage lenders.
One way in which an appraisal 
can go awry is that the information 
upon which the house is valued 
may be very thin; recent nearby 
comparable house sales may be so few 
that the price at which the house is 
likely to be resold may be difficult to 
predict precisely. A second reason the 
appraisal process can go awry is that 
all parties may not want a genuinely 
independent appraisal. 
As we reform our system of 
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wish to focus on is the appraisal 
system.  Indeed, some steps have 
already been taken in this direction.
HOW APPRAISALS ARE
SUPPOSED TO WORK
A standard part of a home mort-
gage is an appraisal, an independent 
evaluation of the home’s value. After 
the seller and buyer have agreed on 
a price, the mortgage lender usually 
requires an appraisal. This is an esti-
mate of the value of the house, made 
by a professional appraiser and based 
on local market conditions; the ap-
praiser examines nearby recently sold 
houses and compares them in terms of 
characteristics such as size, location, 
and condition with the house to be 
mortgaged.
A typical appraisal costs $250 to 
$400. In a boom year like 2005, when 
there were more than 7 million new 
home mortgages on purchases of new 
and existing one- to four-unit family 
homes and a similarly large number 
of refinancings, roughly $4 billion was 
spent on appraisals in the U.S.  These 
appraisals are part of an underwrit-
ing process whose aim is to determine 
whether lenders accept mortgage 
applications. This is a serious process 
with trillions of dollars at stake. In that 
same year, more than 5 million mort-
gages were denied, representing nearly 
$1 trillion of loans applied for.1 
The appraisal further certifies to 
the mortgage originator and — if the 
loan is securitized — to the ultimate 
lender the value of the collateral for 
the mortgage. The appraisal addresses 
the lender’s worries about whether the 
loan will be repaid. In the past, mort-
gages have generally been relatively 
safe loans because the borrower’s home 
backs the promise to repay.2 A house 
as collateral has two advantages for the 
lender: First, the borrowing house-
hold is usually loath to lose its home: 
Moving is costly and so is the loss of 
concomitant personal ties to neighbors 
and schools. So if a family can make 
the payments, it generally will. Second, 
even if the household cannot make 
the payments, the house can be resold, 
and the loan usually can be mostly or 
entirely repaid out of the proceeds.
The typical mortgage loan’s safety 
is connected to the down payment 
made by the borrower; this fact is well-
established by empirical research on 
U.S. data. Briefly, the down payment 
provides an equity stake for the bor-
rower — a commitment of dollars by 
the borrower that the borrower loses if 
he or she defaults — as well as security 
for the mortgage lender.3 One cause 
of recent mortgage losses has been 
house values that have fallen below 
the amount borrowed, a case in which 
the borrower’s home equity stake has 
disappeared as a consequence of bor-
rowing too much and the price of the 
house falling.
While most homeowners will 
continue to pay their mortgages even 
after their home equity has disap-
peared, many find themselves unable 
to keep up with payments, often as a 
result of unemployment or illness, and 
some of them will eventually lose their 
homes to foreclosure. In addition, in 
recent years, a significant proportion 
of homes were bought by investors, 
many of whom are more likely to 
default as home equity is lost.4  Dur-
ing the recent housing boom, housing 
market participants lost sight of the 
importance of the down payment, in 
many cases because house prices kept 
rising so consistently. If house prices 
rise continuously, the down payment 
may not matter. If a house is purchased 
without a down payment, the mortgage 
loan is worth the same as the house, 
and the lender has no margin of safety. 
But if the house price goes up 20 
percent, the margin of safety will have 
reappeared, and the loan will turn 
out to be safe. In the U.S., during the 
six years from the end of 1999 to the 
end of 2005, house prices rose at an 
annual rate of 11.3 percent (according 
to the Case-Shiller U.S. house-price 
index). During that period, on average, 
house-price appreciation created more 
than a 20 percent margin of safety in 
two years’ time. During this period, it 
appeared as if mortgages made with 
no down payments were reasonable 
investments.  By contrast, in the longer 
period from 1970 to 1999, house prices 
appear to have risen about 5 to 6 per-
cent annually.
In more normal times, when 
prices aren’t rising quite so quickly, the 
precise value of the home on the mar-
ket, and whether it will be sufficient to 
repay the mortgage, is crucial informa-
tion for the mortgage lender, since it 
influences both the likelihood that the 
mortgage will lose value and how the 
mortgage lender will approach legal 
options if the borrower falls behind in 
payments.
One way the lender attempts 
to gauge the underlying value of the 
house at the time the loan is made is 
1 National mortgage data are from the HMDA 
National Aggregate Report, 2005, available 
at http://www.ffiec.gov/hmdaadwebreport/
NatAggWelcome.aspx. It is difficult to know 
from these data how many of the denials were 
due to appraisals, but the limited data suggest 
that appraisals were responsible for only a small 
proportion of denials. 
2 In the 1980s, the savings and loan crisis also 
had mortgage lending at its root, but this had 
less to do with mortgage defaults and more to do 
with unusually high long-term interest rates. 
3 For a fuller discussion of the risks of loans and 
the value of the down payment, see Ronel Elul’s 
Business Review article.
4 See, for example, Shane Sherland’s working 
paper on default rates of subprime mortgages 
and Yuliya Demyanyk and Otto Van Hemert’s 
forthcoming article on the decline in mortgage 
lending standards in recent years.Business Review  Q1  2010   13 www.philadelphiafed.org
from the sale price of the house: What 
the borrower is willing to pay for the 
house is usually a good measure of its 
worth. But the buyer may have over-
paid. Worse yet, the buyer may have 
deliberately overpaid to a partner, with 
the pretend “transaction” intended 
to fraudulently extract money from 
the lender.  In a classic “land flip,” 
criminal A sells a house to criminal 
B at an inflated price, and the two 
then abscond with the cash lent by the 
mortgage lender.
To collect more information 
about the underlying value, the 
lender obtains an appraisal of the 
house’s value, that is, an estimate by a 
professional appraiser, based on prices 
paid for local comparable houses. This 
additional information may be needed 
because the borrower may have overbid 
for the house, in which case the lender 
may be leery of financing it. Moreover, 
even if the borrower has paid the right 
price for the house, other sales testify 
that the market for houses in that 
neighborhood is active, and that if the 
house needs to be sold, the market is 
not so thin that an additional house 
for sale will result in a large drop in 
price.
How is the information from the 
appraisal used in the mortgage? First, 
if the information from the appraisal 
does not give the lender confidence 
in the appraisal valuation, the lender 
may refuse to make the mortgage loan. 
For example, if the comparable houses 
used in the appraisal are in a different 
neighborhood from the house being 
appraised, the loan may be refused. 
Second, a conservative rule is used to 
determine the value of the house for 
the purposes of the mortgage.  The 
lender bases whether to approve the 
mortgage on whichever is lower, the 
appraised value or the transaction 
price. The standard conventional 
prime mortgage must have a loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio of 80 percent 
to qualify for a low interest rate; the 
valuation used for this purpose is the 
lower of the appraised value or the 
transaction price.5
Suppose a prospective home 
buyer reaches a purchase agreement to 
buy a house for $100,000. The buyer 
has $20,000 with which to make a 
down payment, so she just qualifies 
for the lowest interest rate, borrow-
ing $80,000. However, suppose the 
appraisal comes in at $95,000. In 
calculating the loan-to-value ratio, the 
mortgage lender will set the value of 
the house at the lesser of the appraisal 
valuation ($95,000) or the sale price 
($100,000). Thus, the mortgage docu-
ment records a house value of $95,000 
and a loan of $80,000, so the loan-to-
value ratio is 84 percent, too high to 
qualify for the best interest rate.  
Appraisals are also used by lenders 
when the borrower wants to refinance 
an existing mortgage or take out a 
second mortgage, also called a home 
equity loan.  Whenever mortgage rates 
have fallen, as they did dramatically 
in 2003, households have refinanced 
their homes to take advantage of 
lower interest rates. Many households 
have taken these opportunities to 
do cash-out refinancing, where they 
increase the size of the mortgage 
loan and reduce their implied home 
equity. Freddie Mac has estimated 
that from 2002 to 2008, over $1 
trillion in cash was taken out of 
prime mortgages. While in many 
cases this cash was used to improve 
the properties — improvements 
that may raise the properties’ value 
and thus only partially reduce home 
equity — research shows that many 
of these cash-outs were used to 
finance consumer expenditures or 
to reduce other debts.6 The high 
loan-to-value ratios resulting from 
cash-out refinancing are by no means 
limited to low- and moderate-income 
populations; many examples come 




Location and Valuation. Let 
us briefly explore the relationship 
between location and value that 
underlies the appraisal and justifies the 
real estate motto: location, location, 
location. One way that houses differ 
from mass-produced goods is that each 
house’s value is in part based on its 
unique location. Location affects vari-
ous attributes of the house, in particu-
lar its distance to other locations, such 
as work sites, shopping, transportation, 
One way the lender attempts to gauge the 
underlying value of the house at the time the 
loan is made is from the sale price of the house: 
What the borrower is willing to pay for the
house is usually a good measure of its worth. 
5 In its guide to mortgage originators (known 
as underwriters), Fannie Mae states, “For a 
purchase mortgage, the LTV ratio is calculated 
by dividing the amount of the mortgage by the 
lower of the appraised value or the sales price 
of the property” and that “an LTV ratio greater 
than 80 percent requires credit enhancement, 
such as primary mortgage insurance.”
6 See the article by Alan Greenspan and James 
Kennedy.  14   Q1  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
and leisure amenities. Houses together 
constitute neighborhoods, united by 
schools, social networks, building 
codes, and political units. Houses close 
to one another are relatively substitut-
able, and their prices will tend to move 
together; houses distant from one 
another are not such easy substitutes 
for one another, and their prices may 
not move together.  
Put another way, a house consists 
of a structure and a piece of land. The 
structure can be valued at its replace-
ment cost, which is likely to be similar 
from one location to the next.  As a 
result, structures are more like mass-
produced goods than unique goods.  
The value of the land, which differs by 
location, can differ very substantially 
from place to place.7
Economists group the determi-
nants of land valuation into amenities 
and work opportunities.  Although 
labor economists often see work as 
the main determinant of wages, urban 
economists see amenities and work op-
portunities as jointly determining both 
wages and land prices.8 In particular, 
the greater the amenities and the 
higher the productivity of nearby work 
opportunities, the greater the price of 
land. By contrast, greater amenities 
tend to lower the wage rate because 
workers may be willing to work for 
lower pay to live in a nice location.
The House Sale. A homeowner 
will typically have a general idea of 
what the house is worth. However, ex-
actly what the house will fetch on the 
market from an actual sale may depend 
on many factors. The potential buyers 
of a given unit have some knowledge 
of the house’s value to themselves as 
specific households relative to other 
units. In addition, they may know the 
prices of recently purchased nearby 
units and the offering prices of nearby 
for-sale units. They then bargain with 
the seller over the particular unit, and 
a sale may take place.9 The price paid 
will depend on bargaining skill, the 
availability of substitute units, charac-
teristics of the particular unit, and the 
buyer’s and seller’s tastes for the ameni-
ties offered by the particular unit.  For 
example, committed sellers, that is, 
those who must sell because they are 
moving to another city or have already 
agreed to purchase another house, are 
more likely to accept a sale price below 
the expected value than sellers who 
are waiting to see what their home will 
fetch.  
All of this matters to the mortgage 
lender because the fact that a house 
has sold at a given price may not be a 
strong guarantee that the house can 
be resold at that same price, should a 
resale prove necessary. In a foreclosure 
sale, that might mean that the lender 
will not be fully repaid for the loan. To 
get a better fix on the underlying value 
of the house, the mortgage lender 
turns to an appraiser.
The Appraisal. In making a 
home appraisal, the appraiser typically 
presents the lender with sales data on 
recent comparable house sales. As part 
of this process, the appraiser will note 
whether these sales are indeed recent 
and closely comparable. All this in-
formation helps the lender know how 
accurate the appraisal is likely to be. 
The lender wants to know how much 
the house in question is likely to sell 
for if a resale is necessary, that is, how 
much the collateral is worth. If a lot of 
similar houses have been sold in the 
neighborhood for similar prices, the 
lender can be reasonably sure that the 
house can be resold, if necessary, for a 
price close to the sale price. However, 
when there aren’t many comparable 
sales, it is possible that no other buyers 
will be found for this particular house 
at or near the sale price.
In a typical appraisal, the ap-
praiser is expected to give an ap-
praised value and to document the 
basis of the valuation. Appraisers are 
subject to state regulation; typically, 
they have certification that they have 
met both education and experience 
requirements.  In addition, appraisers 
are expected to be objective and not 
be swayed by the participants in the 
transaction. Yet the participants have 
an important stake in the success of 
the transaction.10
From the buyer’s perspective, the 
down payment represents the differ-
ence between the sale price and the 
amount the buyer must borrow. If the 
house costs $180,000 (the median sale 
price in the fourth quarter of 2008) 
and the buyer can put $36,000 down 
after meeting transaction costs so the 
down payment is 20 percent of the 
house value, the amount the buyer 
needs to borrow is $144,000. However, 
if the resale value of the house is really, 
say, $160,000, from the perspective of 
the lender, $20,000 has been lost due 
to the borrower’s overpaying for the 
house, and the effective down payment 
is only $16,000, or 10 percent of the 
house value.
7 This distinction is not absolute, of course, and 
structures can become highly idiosyncratic, 
while plots of land within a single development 
or homes within an apartment building may 
be quite similar. Moreover, a structure may 
be unsuited to its location, in which case the 
structure does not add its full value to the land.  
In this case, it is inappropriate to value a house 
as the sum of its value as a structure and a piece 
of land, which can be seen as an upper limit on 
the value of the house.
8 See Gerald Carlino’s Business Review article 
and the chapter by Glenn Blomquist.
9 A formal model that describes a housing 
market in this way is set forth in the article by 
Daniel Quan and John Quigley.  
10 “Today, many appraisers feel that their ethics 
are under assault from clients who expect 
favorable assignment results in return for future 
business…Even so, the pressures appraisers 
feel today are little different from those of the 
past…” See Bruce M. Closser’s article.Business Review  Q1  2010   15 www.philadelphiafed.org
Discrepancies between the sale 
price and the appraised value thus 
create a problem for the lender. If the 
appraisal comes out to be less than the 
agreed sale price, the down payment 
may be insufficient for the loan, and 
the loan may be canceled or lose its 
prime status. 
Because each house is unique, 
there is no perfect estimate of its 
underlying true value. What the lender 
and the borrower both want to know 
is: What would the house sell for if it 
were sold again? The answer to that 
question can only be an estimate, 
subject to some uncertainty.    
HOUSE APPRAISALS ARE 
SYSTEMATICALLY BIASED
Empirical Evidence Shows 
That Appraisals Have Been Biased 
Upward in the U.S. Modern studies 
of the accuracy of home mortgage 
appraisals in the U.S. began with 
an article by Man Cho and Isaac 
Megbolugbe, economists at Fannie 
Mae’s Office of Housing Research, 
who studied the 1993 Fannie Mae loan 
acquisition file, which contained over 
600,000 home-purchase mortgages. 
They found that in this group of 
prime mortgages, only 5 percent 
had appraisals that were lower than 
the transaction price, while over 
30 percent had appraisals that were 
exactly the transaction price. The 
other 65 percent were above the 
purchase price. On its face, these data 
suggest that appraisals may be biased. 
Too many mortgage appraisals are 
exactly at the transaction price, and 
the distribution is highly asymmetric 
(Figure 1).  
Similar evidence is found in the 
article by Terry Loebs, published 
by the Collateral Assessment and 
Technologies Committee, a group 
founded by real estate information 
companies. The article takes a sample 
of 2.9 million home appraisals, from 
Appraisal Bias
Positive bias means appraisal higher than transaction price
FIGURE 1
Appraisal bias is defined as appraised value less transaction value as a percent of transaction 
value. When the bias is positive, the appraised value is greater than the transaction value, and 
there is no impact on the mortgage loan-to-value ratio. On the other hand, when the bias is 
negative, the appraised value is less than the transaction price, and the mortgage loan-to-value 
ratio will be higher (see text).
 
Source: Cho and Megbolugbe, 1996, Table 1, p. 48
11 Note a further asymmetry here.  An appraisal 
that is too low may cause the mortgage to be 
turned down and may allow the borrower to 
back out of the transaction.  An appraisal 
that is too high doesn’t affect the mortgage 
contract directly and doesn’t allow the seller to 
renegotiate.
1977 to 2004, and finds that the 
appraisal price is greater than or equal 
to the transaction price more than 97 
percent of the time. 
The reason for this asymmetry 
is that appraisals below the sale price 
have a different impact from appraisals 
above the sale price. Specifically, the 
home valuation, for the purposes of 
calculating the loan-to-value ratio, is 
equal to the lower of the sale price or 
the appraisal. An appraisal above the 
sale price does not affect the loan-to-
value ratio, but one below the transac-
tion price does. If the loan-to-value 
ratio rises, this may influence whether 
the mortgage lender makes the loan. 
To quote Cho and Megbolugbe, “The 
way to ensure the deal is to appraise 
slightly high. The appraiser asks for or 
receives the transaction price and then 
adds a bit to it. Since the mortgage 
lenders employ the lesser of the sale 
price or the appraisal, whichever is 
lower, in determining the loan value, 
no further information is added be-
cause of the appraisal.”
It is clear that, in some cases, 
when the appraiser reports that the 
appraised value of the house is below 
the transaction price, the seller lowers 
the price, and so the transaction 
price and the appraised value of the 
house come out exactly the same. In 
addition, it is possible that when the 
appraised value is below the sale price, 
the borrower may withdraw from the 
sale, since the mortgage becomes 
harder to complete.11
This would account for some of 
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tion of appraisals in which the bias 
is exactly zero. However, as shown in 
Figure 1, 25 percent of mortgages were 
between zero and 1 percent above the 
purchase price, while only 1.6 percent 
were between zero and 1 percent below 
the purchase price. If this were result-
ing from the transaction price being 
changed or the mortgage being denied, 
it would imply that roughly one-fourth 
of all mortgages were being changed or 
lost due to a 1 percent difference in ap-
praisals. This seems unlikely on its face 
and is not confirmed by professionals.12  
 Why Are Appraisals Likely to 
Be Biased Upward? What appears to 
be occurring is that the parties directly 
involved in the transaction have a mu-
tual interest in a somewhat upwardly 
biased appraisal. A difficulty with the 
underlying contract is that if a house’s 
value is taken to be the lesser of the 
sale price or the appraisal, and both 
are good but imperfect estimates of the 
true value of the house, the lesser of 
the two will be biased low.
If the house value was taken to 
be the average of the two values, and 
both the appraisal and the sale price 
reflected the underlying value of the 
house but with some error, the house 
value would be unbiased. The lesser of 
either value, however, is always going 
to be less than the average of the two 
and hence biased downward.
As we have seen, when the 
appraiser typically errs by setting 
the appraised value at or above the 
sale price, the loan-to-value ratio is 
unaffected. This appears to be what 
happens overall; only in relatively 
few cases (perhaps 5 percent) are the 
appraisals below the sale price. Such 
a practice deprives most appraisals of 
having independent value as measures 
of the value of the house. Only if the 
appraiser is convinced that the home 
buyer has substantially overpaid for 
the house will the appraiser signal this 
to the lender by setting an appraisal 
below the sale price.
With this criterion for estimating 
house value, the mortgage contract 
gives the appraiser too much power 
to accidentally prevent house sales 
from concluding. This creates a strong 
incentive for the appraiser to bias the 
appraisal upward and for the other 
parties — the mortgage lender and the 
real estate broker — to want to hire 
biased appraisers.
Note that typically the buyer is 
not a “victim” of an appraisal that 
is biased high. If the appraisal is too 
low, and if the seller will not lower the 
price, the buyer will have to come up 
with a larger down payment. 
Appraisals for Refinancings May 
Be Even More Biased. A somewhat 
different issue arises with appraisals 
to refinance mortgages because 
there is no sales transaction, since 
the homeowner stays in place. Thus, 
when a house is refinanced, there is 
no sale price with which to compare 
the appraisal. However, there may be 
a “target” price the borrower is hoping 
for. In any case, it is generally believed 
that, in recent years, the appraisals 
for refinancing have been more biased 
than those for home-purchase loans. 
According to Loebs’ report, refinance 
transactions had a somewhat greater 
appraisal bias (5.6 percent) than 
purchase transactions (3.6 percent), 
when median values are compared. 
Apparently, this was a particular 
problem during the recent subprime 
boom.  Many subprime mortgage 
loans were refinanced from prime to 
subprime mortgages. When borrowers 
who had originally had good credit 
and prime mortgages ran into financial 
difficulties, perhaps because of job loss, 
illness, or divorce, these borrowers 
were faced with a choice: They could 
sell their homes and pay off the 
mortgage, or they could refinance. 
But, as mentioned before, homeowners 
generally will avoid having to move 
if at all possible. Such borrowers 
were encouraged to refinance their 
mortgages with a subprime loan while 
taking cash out.  The cash-out would 
then permit the borrower to become 
current on the new but more expensive 
and larger mortgage and thus to 
remain in their homes rather than be 
forced to sell or be foreclosed on.13 As 
we can see in Figure 2, as long as home 
prices kept rising ever faster, through 
late 2005, foreclosure rates were 
kept artificially low, even though the 
underlying mortgages were increasingly 
risky.
These subprime mortgages made 
sense as long as house prices kept 
rising; however, they become highly 
12 A further indication of the bias is that house-
price indexes that were created using both sale 
prices and refinancing appraisals are now widely 
considered to be biased relative to house-price 
indexes constructed using only sale prices, 
despite the fact that a lot of observations are 
lost when refinancing appraisals are ignored. 
Indeed, Andrew Leventis has written a paper 
on how to eliminate the bias from the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency’s (formerly the Office 
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, or 
OFHEO) house-price index while continuing to 
incorporate information from appraisals.  
A somewhat different issue arises with 
                                         
there is no sales transaction, since the 
homeowner stays in place.
13 See the article by Kristopher Gerardi, Adam 
Hale Shapiro, and Paul Willen for a discussion 
of the history of borrowers who wind up using 
subprime loans.risky when house prices began falling. 
They were even more tempting during 
the period from 2003 to 2005, when 
long-term interest rates, and mortgage 
interest rates in particular, were 
unusually low.  In Figure 3, we see that 
beginning at 2003, 30-year mortgage 
rates (as measured by Freddie Mac) 
fell below 6 percent for the first time 
in over 30 years.  As a consequence, 
the rate of mortgage originations 
rose to about $1 trillion a quarter!  
Refinancings drove these record rates 
of originations.
Consequences of Bad Apprais-
als. If appraisals are not trustworthy, 
lenders may wind up lending too much 
money relative to the home’s value. 
When this happens, defaults are more 
likely to occur.14 Unfortunately, there 
has been very little academic work on 
the impact of biased appraisals despite 
the importance of the subject.
The lone published academic 
article, by Michael Lacour-Little and 
Stephen Malpezzi, uses a small data set 
from Alaska in the 1980s to show evi-
dence that for a single thrift institution 
in Alaska, appraisal bias was positively 
associated with more frequent default. 
If, indeed, appraisal bias has 
been larger for subprime loans, then 
since we know that subprime loans 
have experienced a very high rate 
of delinquency and loss,15 there 
may be a substantial relationship 
between appraisal bias and poor loan 
performance. But, in general, one 
might expect a relationship between 
appraisal bias and subsequent loan 
performance, not only because 
14An article by Yongheng Deng, John Quigley, 
and Robert Van Order provides the best 
evidence of the size of this default impact, and 
Ronel Elul’s Business Review article provides a 
more accessible qualitative view.
15 As of mid-2009, reports say that half of all 
subprime loans are either in foreclosure or are 
delinquent, that is, at least 30 days behind in 
payment.
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Foreclosure Rates Remained Low As Long 
                                     
FIGURE 2
                                             
FIGURE 3
Sources of data: (1) Foreclosure rate: Mortgage Bankers Association, mortgage foreclosures started, 
quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and annualized, Haver Analytics; (2) House-price inflation: S&P/
Case-Shiller U.S. National House Price Index, seasonally adjusted, quarterly, at annual rates, Haver 
Analytics.
Sources of data: All data, Freddie Mac, Primary Mortgage Market Survey, Haver Analytics. (1) 
Mortgage rates: 30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage Interest Rate, percent;  (2) Total Mortgages and 
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While auctions are often a good way to sell 
objects, it is not clear that they fetch the best 
price in real estate, where information costs 
                                             
         
appraisal bias may be evidence of poor 
lending practices but also because 
appraisal bias may permit weak or 
fraudulent loans. Disentangling the 
role of appraisal bias in the recent 
housing crisis is an important avenue 
for research.
A FEEDBACK LOOP IN 
APPRAISAL ACCURACY
The Current Situation.  
Beginning in 2008, we have entered 
a period of high home foreclosures in 
which many homeowners have lost 
their homes due to nonpayment of 
their mortgages.  A large proportion of 
all house sales in 2009 appear to have 
been homes that had been foreclosed 
in the 12 months before sale, as much 
as 20 percent, according to zillow.
com.16  While this report is difficult to 
verify, it is clear that total foreclosures 
— whether they are soon sold or 
not  — are indeed very substantial. 
According to the Mortgage Bankers 
Association, as we can see in Figure 1, 
the annual foreclosure rate has risen 
to over 5 percent.  Since in 2007, 
according to the American Housing 
Survey, there were an estimated 50 
million mortgages held by households 
who occupy their own homes, and that 
number is unlikely to have fallen much 
by 2009, that implies over 2 million 
foreclosures. With total single-family 
home sales running less than 5 million 
annually in 2009, this suggests that the 
zillow.com rate of foreclosures is by no 
means implausibly high. 
Why does the proportion of 
foreclosure sales matter?  Because 
they could be reducing even further 
the appraised value of homes.  In 
some areas, many of the house prices 
available for comparison in appraisals 
may be from foreclosure or otherwise 
distressed sales. Many of these houses 
are being sold at foreclosure auctions. 
This may cause some of them to be 
sold below their usual market price 
and may cause a downward drag on 
estimates of house prices.
While auctions are often a good 
way to sell objects, it is not clear that 
they fetch the best price in real estate, 
where information costs are high, and 
when obtaining finance is often dif-
ficult. Indeed, there is some evidence 
that an impatient seller does not get 
the best price.17 According to a study 
by John Campbell, Stefano Giglio, and 
Parag Pathak, using data from Massa-
chusetts, they find that foreclosed 
homes sell for nearly 30 percent less 
than they otherwise would. If fore-
closure sales, on average, produce low 
prices, this may make it more difficult 
to ascertain what the true underlying 
value of homes is.
Uncertainty and foreclosure may 
now be causing house appraisals to be 
biased too low.  Under current arrange-
ments, low mortgage appraisals will 
tend to cause too few mortgage loans 
to be approved. This, in turn, lowers 
the demand for homes and may cause 
the price of homes to sink lower than 
they otherwise would.  
In addition to these distressed-
market price distortions, the volume of 
sales affects the accuracy of appraisals. 
This is a network effect that generates 
economies of scale18 — the more 
participants, the better — that can 
create a feedback loop: Fewer sales 
mean less accurate appraisals, thereby 
making lenders leery of lending, which 
further reduces sales. William Lang 
and I developed a model of home sales 
and appraisals back in 1993 in which 
a reduction in completed home-sale 
transactions can feed on itself.  
A Possible Vicious Cycle. The 
reason for this particular feedback loop 
is that if the pace of home sales slows, 
the appraisal becomes less precise. 
This makes the mortgage riskier, mak-
ing it more likely the lender will reject 
it. If the home mortgage application 
is rejected, the transaction may fall 
through and thus no sale will be made. 
This further reduces the precision with 
which the underlying value of houses 
in that neighborhood is known and 
possibly induces more mortgage rejec-
tions.
Our model identifies two some-
what separate issues. One is that small 
changes in, say, borrowers’ risk, which 
16 Zillow.com is a website that seeks to aggregate 
information about home sales.  This estimate 
is taken from Dan Levy, “U.S. Underwater 
Mortgages May Reach 30%, Zillow Says,” 
Bloomberg News, August 11, 2009.
17 See the article by David Genesove and 
Christopher Mayer.
18A classic economy of scale exists when a firm’s 
per unit costs fall the more output increases. 
When this is true, the most efficient way to 
produce is to have a single firm produce for 
the entire market.  Another kind of economy 
of scale is a network economy of scale: The 
more participants there are, the more valuable 
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may cause a given loan to be rejected, 
can lead to large and persistent changes 
in the market equilibrium. The feed-
back effect can cause mortgages to be-
come much riskier and therefore make 
a real estate market face lower transac-
tions and lower prices for a sustained 
period of time.  The second issue is 
that these effects may be inefficient 
because they are caused by a market 
failure and therefore may call for some 
form of public intervention.
The problem is that one person’s 
transaction provides information 
(about the local value of homes) that 
is useful to others’ ability to complete 
their own transactions on nearby 
homes. In an ideal world, the buyers 
who come later would be able to com-
pensate earlier buyers for providing this 
information. But there is no simple way 
for a potential buyer to compensate 
an earlier buyer. In turn, the number 
of transactions will typically be lower 
than would occur if some system of 
compensation were feasible.
This type of market failure is 
called an externality: An activity exter-
nal to a given economic action affects 
the value of the action. Other, more fa-
miliar examples of externalities are air 
pollution (such as carbon emissions) 
and pollination by insects such as bees. 
When an externality occurs, existing 
markets may not be efficient, and it 
is possible that a government policy 
intervention could improve economic 
outcomes. For example, the Internet 
presents a network externality: The 
greater the number of people who use 
the Internet, the more valuable the 
Internet becomes. Government assis-
tance helped establish the first Internet 
link-up, and we can argue that this 
was a good use of public funds because 
the first users of a network such as the 
Internet do not gain as much value as 
those who use it once there is wide-
spread adoption.
 But these externalities cut both 
ways. Growing networks add value to 
all users, but shrinking networks fall 
in value. When a given technology 
becomes less used, it may become less 
efficient for all users. Anyone who has 
recently rented a shopworn videocas-
sette of a classic movie has experienced 
this effect.  
Similarly, a mortgage loan may 
be denied because the lender thinks 
there is a chance the borrower may 
default on the loan. But if the loan is 
close to being acceptable, perhaps the 
lender would make the loan if the bor-
rower paid a small amount extra. Now 
because future buyers and sellers (and 
lenders) would benefit from the sale 
going through (because it would shed 
light on the value of properties in that 
neighborhood), this information might 
be worth enough to warrant paying the 
additional amount the lender would 
require to make this loan. That is, 
society as a whole might be better off if 
the mortgage was accepted, although 
private incentives lead to the mortgage 
being rejected.  
Quantitative Importance of 
Appraisal Information Externalities. 
Empirical papers, some gathered in 
two issues of the Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, have served 
to confirm a number of the points 
raised in this model. For example, Paul 
Calem showed that in white house-
holds, the mortgage denial rate rises 
as the number of home sales increases. 
It does appear that fewer transactions 
are associated with a higher rate of 
loan rejection. However, an interesting 
variation can occur.
The model we have been discuss-
ing supposes that borrowers and lend-
ers are individual players in a large, 
competitive market, rather than domi-
nant players, so that the price informa-
tion provided by a transaction is not of 
much value to either party: It can be 
used by any lender or borrower. As a 
result, neither party has an incentive 
to go the extra mile to conclude the 
deal because of the information value 
alone. However, if one lender is a pre-
dominant lender in an area, the lender 
may take future potential transactions 
into account: In a neighborhood where 
deals are few, the lender may push 
through a mortgage for the sake of pro-
viding more information, knowing that 
by encouraging future transactions, the 
lender may be recompensed for making 
a slightly excessively risky loan.  That 
is, the externality can be internalized by 
the lender.19  
To the extent that this occurs, 
the externality may be mitigated by 
the marketplace, and public interven-
tion may not be justified. However, 
monopoly lending will itself tend to be 
a problem: Ignoring the informational 
externality, monopolists tend to charge 
higher rates and make fewer loans than 
would competitive lenders.
 A more recent paper by McKinley 
Blackburn and Todd Vermilyea 
presents a test of the relevance of 
these informational externalities 
on mortgage loan data primarily 
from 1998. To test for information 
externalities, they use a sample of over 
2,000 mortgage loans that comes with 
detailed data about the borrowers. 
They confirm the existence of these 
informational externalities and 
estimate that 10 percent of the tracts 
in their sample are materially affected 
by the externality. This is in addition 
to the economies of scale by lender 
that Avery and co-authors found.
In essence, what Blackburn and 
Vermilyea do is show that the prob-
ability that a lender will turn down a 
particular mortgage application varies 
19 A paper by Robert Avery, Patricia Beeson, 
and Mark Sniderman argues that all of the 
externality was internal to the lender. However, 
this paper had the weakness of not having 
detailed information about the borrowers.  20   Q1  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
with the average number of home 
sales successfully completed in the 
census tract. Unlike previous studies, 
their study has detailed data about the 
mortgage applicant and the mortgage 
application, including detailed credit 
information about the applicant and 
the applicant’s income, employment 
history, race, sex, and marital status. 
These effects on denials apply to 
census tracts with 20 or fewer home 
sales in the previous year, or about 10 
percent of census tracts. In addition, 
more denials occur when the lender 
has fewer than eight sales in a given 
tract.  
One reason that house prices 
might fall further than they other-
wise would is that after a period of 
having appraisals that were biased 
upward, we have entered a period in 
which appraisals are being performed 
with less bias and which are now less 
precise. This may well have resulted in 
a substantial increase in the number of 
mortgage applications denied, applica-
tions that would have been accepted 
a few years earlier. This in turn may 
have made it harder for purchasers to 
buy houses, reducing effective demand 
and resulting in lower house prices.
APPRAISAL INACCURACY: 
CAN SOMETHING BE DONE?
Appraisals have become more 
inaccurate for three reasons: bias, 
fewer home sales, and foreclosures. 
Can the contract be rewritten so that 
there is more room for variation in the 
appraisal, so that the appraisal will 
typically be more informative? This is 
a matter for future research, but it is an 
urgent question. 
Negotiations between Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the New York 
attorney general’s office have resulted 
in a “Home Value Protection Program 
and Cooperation Agreement,” whose 
main aim is to prevent lenders from 
influencing appraisals.
The major impact of the new 
agreement is to ensure that appraisers 
are not chosen by parties whose only 
incentive is to make the loan and who 
have little regard for the loan’s safety. 
Thus, mortgage brokers are excluded 
from choosing appraisers, and restric-
tions are placed on how the “in-house” 
appraisers used by mortgage lenders are 
chosen; in particular, the process must 
be independent of the loan production 
staff.  
This agreement will tend to en-
sure that appraisals are arrived at more 
objectively.  However, it may have the 
side effect of making mortgage loans 
harder to obtain and may cause some 
sound home loans to be rejected.  
Moreover, we have emphasized 
that if appraisals are unbiased esti-
mates of a house’s value, the house 
value — which is based on the lesser 
of the sale price and the appraisal 
value — is biased downward. So the 
downward bias will likely have a larger 
impact on causing sound mortgages to 
be rejected as appraisals become more 
objective.
How to reduce the incentives for 
an upwardly biased appraisal is a diffi-
cult problem that has not been solved.  
The fundamental problem is that a 
low appraisal can cause the mortgage 
to be rejected, and this may be due 
not to the intrinsic value of the house, 
but to the fact that the appraisal is an 
estimate, and is not exact.
One possible solution to this 
problem is to deliberately add a small, 
fixed amount, say, 3 percent, to the 
appraisal. This would provide a reason-
able leeway for the possible error in the 
appraisal. Then the house value used 
in determining the loan-to-value ratio 
would be the sale price or the appraisal 
plus 3 percent, whichever was lower. In 
most cases, this would mean that the 
appraisal (plus 3 percent) was higher 
than the sale price, and the house 
value would be affected only when the 
appraisal was substantially below the 
sale price. This would largely eliminate 
the direct incentive for the appraisal 
to be biased upward and permit the 
appraiser to honestly value the house 
without excessively discouraging home 
mortgages. If appraisers become used 
to unbiased appraisals, this might also 
encourage more balanced appraisals of 
refinanced properties.20 However, pos-
sible changes to the mortgage contract 
like this one need much careful study.
Here it would be helpful if more 
appraisal data were available. Although 
both the appraisal and the sale price 
are recorded as part of the mortgage 
data required by the lender, many 
real estate data sets do not separately 
include the appraisal and the sale 
price. Rather, what is recorded is the 
house value, almost always the sale 
price in a home-purchase mortgage 
and the appraisal in a refinance. This 
20 If the procedures used by the appraisers are 
the same for home-purchase mortgages as for 
refinancings, lower bias in the home-purchase 
mortgage may spill over into the refinanced 
mortgage. In either case, lenders and others can 
monitor the bias of appraisers using tools such 
as automated appraisal systems.
Appraisals have become more inaccurate for 
three reasons: bias, fewer home sales, and 
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makes it difficult for most researchers 
to examine appraisal practices.
For those who have the data, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other 
processors of mortgage data have 
created proprietary loan valuation 
products, called automated valuation 
models, to estimate the underlying 
value of mortgages, that is, to create 
an automated second appraisal that 
can be used to further judge the value 
of a house. These statistical models do 
not provide as good an appraisal as the 
local appraiser on the ground could, 
but they are highly useful in helping 
lenders to gauge the risk in valuations 
and to detect appraisal bias.
It would be very helpful if the data 
sets that include appraisals — such 
as those of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac and the other mortgage-lending 
government entities such as the 
Federal Housing Administration and 
the Veterans Administration — were 
made broadly available to researchers, 
analysts, lenders, and appraisers, 
subject to standard privacy protections. 
These data sets could, for example, 
be used to verify that appraisers have 
in fact reformed their procedures 
and are generally providing unbiased 
appraisals.
Note, however, that basing 
appraisals on sales of foreclosed homes 
is likely to cause a further downward 
bias. On the other hand, appraisers 
may not be able to find enough sales of 
nonforeclosed homes to provide a good 
estimate of normal home sales. To the 
extent that more data can be made 
easily and quickly accessible, some of 
these problems may be overcome.  
The current appraisal process 
may make it more difficult for sound 
borrowers to conclude home purchases. 
If so, that could be limiting the 
demand for existing homes, which 
could result in house values falling 
further. And that could worsen 
financial losses and delay a return to 
normalcy in home real estate markets.
If we do not act to improve the 
appraisal system, we may end up with 
the worst of both worlds. That is, we 
may experience a period of objective 
appraisals that cause more mortgages 
to fail, but as the current crisis fades 
from memory, end up back in a 
situation in which all parties desire 
biased appraisals. And that might well 
mean that biased appraisals could 
eventually reappear and help reflate 
another housing bubble.  B R 
If we do not act to 
improve the appraisal 
system, we may end 
up with the worst of 
both worlds.REFERENCES
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